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2 Pritchard (2007, p. 71) speaks 
instead of the belief in question 
being true in most nearby worlds 
in which it is held. This weakening 
does nothing to alleviate the 
problem of necessary truths 
discussed below.
3 For instance, Sainsbury says that 
“if you know, you could not easily 
have been wrong. No equivalence 
is claimed: the absence of easy 
possibility [of error] is only claimed 
to be a necessary condition for 
knowledge” (1997, p. 908).
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ABSTRACT
Safety-based theories of knowledge face a difficulty surrounding necessary truths: no sub-
ject could have easily falsely believed such a proposition. Failing to predict that ill-ground-
ed beliefs in such propositions do not constitute knowledge, standard safety theories are 
therefore less informative than desired. Some have suggested that the subjects at issue 
could easily have believed some related false proposition; but they have given no indication 
as to what makes a proposition related. I suggest a solution to this problem: a belief is safe 
iff its subject could not easily have believed a false answer to the same question.





A number of authors have advocated a safety constraint on knowledge. Thus, Ernest Sosa, 
for example, claims that “[i]n order to […] constitute knowledge a belief must be safe” (1999, 
p. 142); or, in other words, “[n]o belief constitutes knowledge unless safe” (1999, p. 143). Similar-
ly, Timothy Williamson says that “[i]f one knows […] one’s belief is safely true” (2000, p.  147). 
Other examples abound in the literature (e.g. Pritchard, 2007; Sainsbury, 1997).
Clearly, these theorists think that the safety of a belief is necessary for knowledge. But what is 
safety? More  ecifically, what is it for a belief to be safe, or safely true? The notion is a modal one. 
Sosa says that a subject S’s belief that p is safe if, and only if, “S would not believe that p without 
it being the case that p” (1999, p. 142). Williamson suggests that safety consists in “the avoidance 
of false belief at close worlds” (2000, p. 149), and that one’s belief is safely true if, and only if, “one 
could not easily have been wrong in a similar case” (2000, p. 147). And Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa 
and Matthias Steup propose that to say that S’s belief that p is safe is to say that “[i]n all nearby 
worlds where S believes that p, p is not false” (2014, section 5.2), but is, presumably, true instead.2 
For the sake of determinacy, let us stick with this last account, which is, I believe, quite standard.
Safety theorists have not, in general, claimed that this condition (possessing a safe belief that p), 
which entails both truth (because the actual world is nearby to itself) and belief (since one cannot 
have a safe belief without having a belief), is sufficient for knowledge (that p).3 So if it should turn out 
that there are beliefs that are safe in this sense but which do not, intuitively, constitute knowledge, 
that is not, in and of itself, a problem for the view. And indeed, it seems relatively easy to come up 
with examples in which beliefs are safe in this sense yet don’t constitute knowledge. Suppose, for 
instance, that Crazy Jailbird is in a maximum security prison, such that he couldn’t easily fail to be 
in prison tomorrow night. However, Crazy believes utterly erroneously that he has friends on the 
outside who are conspiring to free him; moreover, he believes that a certain coin, which is in fact 
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fair, serves as an oracle. He comes to the view that if the next 
toss of his coin lands heads he will be freed tomorrow, but that 
he will not be freed until later in the week if the coin lands tails. 
He tosses the coin, it lands tails, and he comes to the view that 
he will be in prison tomorrow night. If this is the only reason 
Crazy believes he will be in prison tomorrow night, then he 
does not know that he will be, even though his belief is safe.
So the idea is not that knowledge consists in safe belief: 
rather, it seems that safety is a consequence of knowledge. 
More  ecifically, the safety of a knowledgeable belief might 
be thought to follow from the fact that knowledge must have 
an appropriate doxastic-cum-epistemic basis or ground. If a 
belief has such a basis–which, if it is to be knowledge it must–
then, the argument goes, if its object were false, that basis for 
belief would not have been available, and the belief would not 
have been held. So the belief in question could not easily have 
been falsely held, and knowledgeable beliefs are safe.
That this is the central idea underlying safety theories 
can serve to explain the following otherwise potentially puz-
zling claim of Williamson’s:
In many cases, someone with no idea of 
what knowledge is would be unable to de-
termine whether safety obtained. […] One 
may have to decide whether safety obtains 
[in such cases] by first deciding whether 
knowledge obtains, rather than vice versa 
(2009, p. 305).
If safety theorists such as Williamson were proposing to 
reduce knowledge to safely true belief, this might be thought to 
be problematic; but if instead safety is held to be a consequence 
of knowledge, then it can simply be maintained that certain 
possibilities are more similar to the actual case (and therefore 
could easily have obtained) than others (which could not) be-
cause they hold fixed whether knowledge obtains in those cas-
es, and so they hold fixed the actual grounds for belief.
Nonetheless, even if safety is not thought to be sufficient 
for knowledge, the claim that safety is necessary for knowledge 
yields determinate predictions, and so is informative. For it is 
possible to argue, and in some sense explain the fact, that a be-
lief does not constitute knowledge by showing that it is not safe. 
If Jailbird could easily have been paroled tomorrow morning, 
his belief that he will be in prison tomorrow night would not 
constitute knowledge since it could easily have been false, not 
being connected to its truth in an appropriate manner.
The Problem of Necessary Truths
There is, however, a problem. Any belief in a necessary 
truth is safe. While this fact does not present the theory with 
any counterexamples, it does make the safety condition, as 
formulated above, utterly trivial and uninformative in these 
cases. We cannot argue that a belief in a necessary truth is 
not knowledge on the grounds that it isn’t safe. For instance, 
if Crazy Mathematician thinks her actually fair coin is an 
oracle, then she might come to the view that Fermat’s Last 
Theorem is true if, and only if, the next toss of her coin lands 
heads: if it then does land heads and she comes to believe that 
Fermat’s Last Theorem holds, her belief does not constitute 
knowledge; yet we cannot argue that it does not by appeal to 
the safety condition articulated above, for her belief couldn’t 
have been false, and so, a fortiori, could not easily have been 
false. This problem of necessary truths might be thought to 
restrict the interest of the safety requirement on knowledge.4
Williamson (2000, p. 181-182) responds to this problem 
by suggesting that what matters for the safety of a belief is 
not whether that very belief could easily have been false but 
whether the subject could easily have had a false belief in a 
related proposition.5 This, it seems to me, is correct in so far as 
it goes. But it is vague. Which propositions count as related? 
My proposal, roughly  eaking, is that a proposition is 
related to the proposition that p if, and only if, it is an answer 
to the same question. One way to fill this out is to say that a 
belief that p is safe if, and only if, the subject could not easily 
have had a false belief on the question whether p. As we shall 
see, if this  ecific proposal is adopted, problematic cases will 
remain: but perhaps a slightly more general idea will suffice; 
and in any case, even the  ecific proposal yields a non-trivial 
constraint on our knowledge of necessities. But we will come 
to all of this in due course.
Questions
First, we must ask: What is a question? It will be useful 
to approach this issue via the distinct but related question, 
What is a proposition? Propositions are quite familiar to phi-
losophers. They are the objects of certain  eech acts, e.g. the 
declarative  eech act of assertion; they are what we assert 
when we assert something. They also occur semantically 
embedded in indirect discourse constructions such as “Amy 
said that it is snowing,” and in certain attitude ascriptions, e.g. 
“John believes that it is raining.” Finally, they are the objects 
of certain psychological attitudes, such as belief–namely, the 
propositional attitudes.
More substantively, there has been some dispute about 
what propositions are. For instance, there is an internal dis-
agreement amongst those who think of them as structured 
entities about what the nature of their constituents might 
be, with neo-Russellians holding that they comprise objects, 
properties, and relations as parts, and neo-Fregeans maintain-
4 Indeed, Pritchard (2007, p. 71) explicitly, though unnecessarily, restricts attention to contingent propositions in his formulation of the 
safety requirement on knowledge.
5 See also Sainsbury (1997, p. 908-909).
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ing that the constituents in question are rather modes of pre-
sentation of such worldly entities: however, those working in 
formal semantics have found it useful to think of propositions 
as (unstructured) sets of possible worlds; and in any case, ev-
eryone can at least agree that they determine sets of worlds.
Similarly, then, a question is the object of a certain kind 
of  eech act, e.g. the interrogative act of asking: it is what we 
ask when we ask a question. It is also, semantically  eaking, 
the object of the verb in certain linguistic constructions, e.g. 
“John wondered who took the last cookie,” and “Mary asked 
whether it was raining.” And Jane Friedman (2013) has re-
cently argued that questions are the objects of certain kinds of 
psychological attitudes–attitudes such as wondering, which 
she calls interrogative attitudes.
Formal theorists (e.g. Hamblin, 1973) have found it use-
ful to think of questions as sets of their (complete) answers, 
that is, as sets of propositions that (completely) answer them. 
Thus, if propositions are sets of possible worlds, questions are 
families (or sets) of (certain) such sets; and in any case, every-
one can agree that they determine such sets of sets of worlds. 
Thus, we may say that questions are, or determine, partitions 
of the domain of possible worlds.6
Some answers are complete and others are incomplete. 
Suppose I host a party, that Amy, Bob, and Charlie come, and 
that Doug and Emily do not. (And let’s suppose that there are 
no other people.) Then the question, Who came to the par-
ty? can be answered completely by saying that Amy, Bob, and 
Charlie did. Another possible complete answer is that Charlie 
and Doug did. This alternative answer is not a correct answer, 
but it is a possibly correct, complete answer. By contrast, the 
proposition that Amy came to the party correctly answers the 
question, but does not answer it completely.
A Solution
With this background in place, we can now say what it 
is for a belief to be safe. A first, simple proposal is that S’s be-
lief that p is safe if, and only if, S could not easily have had a 
false belief on the question of whether p–that is, the question 
whose two complete answers are p and not p. This deals with 
some instances of the problem of necessary truths, for in-
stance, the case of the Crazy Mathematician discussed above. 
The subject’s belief in that case is safe in the Ichikawa-Steup 
sense above, but intuitively it does not constitute knowledge. 
Yet the new account of safety readily accounts for the fail-
ure of knowledge in this case, since the Crazy Mathematician 
could easily have had a false belief on the question of whether 
Fermat’s Last Theorem is true; indeed, she would have done 
had the coin she tossed landed tails (which it could easily have 
done). Thus, her belief is not safe in the new sense; and since 
its being so is necessary for it to constitute knowledge, she 
does not know Fermat’s Last Theorem.
However, there remain problematic cases. Consider the 
following example, due to Roland and Cogburn, which in-
volves Sam, whose calculator is broken
so that it always tells the user that whatever 
number entered is prime. Sam uses his cal-
culator to randomly check whether or not 
[some prime number p] is prime, and it an-
swers affirmatively. As a result, Sam forms 
the true belief that [p] is a prime number 
(2011, p. 550).
In this case of the Broken Calculator, Sam could not eas-
ily have formed a false belief on the question of whether p is 
prime, since he could not easily have formed the belief that 
it is not prime: accordingly, his belief is safe, not only in the 
Ichikawa/Steup sense, but also in the sense just articulated; 
and Broken Calculator therefore shows that the safety con-
straint so construed is not sufficient for knowledge.
There are two things that might be said in response to 
this case. The first, more ambitious reply, begins by noting 
that the proposition that p is prime does not only answer 
the question whether p is prime; it is also a partial answer 
to the question, Which numbers are prime? Moreover, 
Sam could easily have had a false belief on this question: 
after all, he selects p as the number to check at random; 
and had he decided to check some composite number c in-
stead, he would have formed a false belief in (partial) an-
swer to the question of which numbers are prime–namely, 
the false belief that c is prime.
This suggests that a more subtle safety condition on 
knowledge might be articulated as follows: a subject S’s 
belief that p is safe if, and only if, S could not easily have 
believed a false answer to the question Q to which p is sa-
liently an answer. Clearly, though, this suggestion does not 
determine precisely which question this is; so it does not yet 
resolve the vagueness of the Williamsonian proposal men-
tioned above. Nonetheless, there are a number of ways in 
which the proposal might be made more concrete, thereby 
resolving at least some of the underlying vagueness; and the 
appeal to a salient question might provide a means of unify-
ing the various propositions that are relevant to the safety of 
the belief at issue in a given case.
The second, more modest reply is to note that our aim 
was to find an informative constraint on knowledge of nec-
essary truths; and, as we have seen in connection with Crazy 
Mathematician, the simple proposal that a subject S’s belief 
6 Some questions have presuppositions–for instance, the question of whether you have stopped beating your wife. These may not 
appear to partition the whole space of possible worlds: some (ugly) worlds are ones in which you continue to beat your wife, and some 
(bad) worlds are ones in which you have stopped; but there are also (good) worlds in which you have never beaten your wife (perhaps 
because you don’t have one). Formally, however, we can treat this final case as just one more cell in the partition of worlds that consti-
tutes the question.
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that p is safe if and only if S could not easily have had a false 
belief on the question of whether p provides just that. Thus, 
in particular, if the case of Crazy Jailbird does not undermine 
safety-based approaches to knowledge, then the case of the 
Broken Calculator shouldn’t be taken to undermine the pro-
posal advanced here either. On the current proposal, safe be-
lief is not sufficient for knowledge, but it is both necessary and 
non-trivial, even when it comes to our knowledge of necessi-
ties–and that is exactly what was sought.7
Concluding Remarks
I am not the first to propose that the theory of knowl-
edge may benefit from the deployment of the notion of a 
question. Jonathan Schaffer (2007) has argued that knowl-
edge is a three-place relation between a subject, a proposi-
tion, and a question.8 If he is right, then (assuming safety is a 
necessary condition on knowledge) that might explain why 
we need to appeal to questions when explaining the notion 
of safety. Nevertheless, my proposal is different from–indeed, 
less committal than–Schaffer’s, in two  ecific (though not 
entirely unrelated) re ects. First, even on the ambitious pro-
posal, I am not suggesting anything about the semantics in 
general, or the logical form in particular, of knowledge attri-
butions. Accordingly, while the question that is salient might 
be determined by some feature of the context of  eech, this 
is by no means required; it might, for instance, be fixed by 
some feature of the situation in which the subject finds him or 
herself.9 Second, my proposal, whether modest or ambitious, 
is concerned directly with safety, not knowledge; it therefore 
has no immediate implications for those who reject safe-
ty-based approaches to epistemology. Accordingly, those who 
reject Schaffer’s position may nonetheless find something of 
value in what I have said here.
Other theorists have appealed tacitly to questions, while 
failing to do so explicitly. Thus, Nozick, for instance, in char-
a erizing his sensitivity-based account of knowledge, sug-
gests that a subject who knows that p is such that she would 
believe that p if she were to “have a belief whether (or not) p” 
(1981, p. 179) in a case in which p; and she would not have 
the belief that p in the case in which not p. But the quoted 
phrase is not quite grammatical as it stands; what’s needed 
for full acceptability is the insertion of (e.g.) “on the question 
(of)” between “belief ” and “whether.” With questions now be-
ing granted the philosophical re ectability long afforded to 
propositions, we can have no qualms about explicitly recog-
nizing their role in the theory of knowledge.10 
In any case, the notion of a question has, until recently, 
been relatively neglected in philosophical theorizing. I have 
found a new application for it–in explicating the notion of 
safety in such a way that safety theorists of knowledge have 
a (relatively) precise and non-trivial theory of our knowl-
edge of necessary truths. This not only constitutes an ad-
vance on this  ecific topic; it also provides some further, if 
modest, inductive evidence of the theoretical utility of ques-
tions more generally.11
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